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  This paper investigates whether differences in productivity explain why some Japanese 
manufacturing firms sell only in the domestic market, while others serve foreign markets, either 
through exports, overseas production, outsourcing or licensing. Using firm level data, it is shown 
empirically that the productivity of multinational firms differs significantly from that of firms that 
sell only in the domestic market. It shows therefore that the heterogeneous productivity levels 
explain the channels of multinational enterprises.  
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1 Introduction 
Companies doing business in a foreign market face various disadvantages vis-à-vis local competitors, 
such as a lack of consumer recognition or established supplier networks, having to operate in an 
unfamiliar culture and legal system, etc. Economic theory therefore suggests that firms which set up 
production facilities overseas need to be sufficiently productive to compensate for these disadvantages. 
And underpinning this productivity are the intangible assets that multinational enterprises possess, 
including their stock of technological knowledge accumulated by R&D or the accumulation of marketing 
know-how from past advertising activity. Furthermore, it is expected that the recipient country will benefit 
from such inflows.  
Based on this line of reasoning, this chapter aims to investigate whether firms’ productivity is a 
determinant of their mode of serving foreign markets, i.e., whether they rely on FDI, exporting, 
outsourcing or licensing. The literature suggests that firms which serve foreign markets through exporting, 
outsourcing or licensing are potential MNEs. Examining the nexus between productivity and the mode of 
serving foreign markets, Head and Ries (2002), for example, show that firms which transfer production 
overseas typically are most productive than their competitors, compensating for the investment costs 
required to shift production abroad. Similarly, exporting firms, which need to bear the transport costs 
associated with exporting, usually are more productive than firms which only sell to the domestic market. 
Along similar lines, Caves (1996) argued that firms which possess more advanced and complicated 
  2technology tend to choose FDI rather than licensing. Meanwhile, Helpman and Grossman (2002) suggest 
that constraints on the nature of the contracts which firms can write with suppliers or employees also play 
a role, providing another explanation why firms’ productivity levels may determine their mode of serving 
overseas markets.  
International business activity has increased rapidly through in recent years, both through exports and 
the establishment of foreign affiliates (see Table 1a). There are prominent firms building a variety of 
production systems in order to maximize profits. For example, as Table 1b shows, Intel produces its 
products in various subsidiaries, in which the parent company holds equity stakes and decides on 
important business matters. On the other hand, other firms, such as Ericsson, or Flectronics, do not rely on 
subsidiaries but utilize unaffiliated, independent firms. The economic literature suggests that firms with 
complex and advanced technology tend to internalize production processes in order to avoid leakages of 
their technology. However, as shown in Table 1b, 1c, and 1d, it is noteworthy that in order to expand their 
business activity, some firms in the telecommunication equipment industry, some of the largest 
manufacturers, such as Ericsson and Flectronics (see Tables 1c and 1d), externalize production, that is, 
they rely on outsourcing.  
  3Table 1a Selected Indicators of FDI and International Production 1982-1999 
                               (Unit: Billions of dollars) 
1982 1990 1999
FDI inflows 58 209 865
FDI outflows 37 245 800
FDI inward stock 594 1761 4772
FDI outward stock 567 1716 4759
Cross border M&A N.A. 151 720
Sales of foreign affiliates  2462 5503 13564
Exports of goods non factor servic 2041 4173 6892
 Source: UNCTAD (2000) 
 Note: Sales of foreign affiliates are estimated from those of France, Germany, Italy, Japan and U.S. 
      Exports are estimated from those of Japan and U.S. The others are for World from UNCTAD estimates.  
 
Table 1b Examples of Different International Production Systems 
Internalized Mixed Externalized
(Equity control) (Equity and non equity) (non equity)
Technology driven Semiconductor  Telecom equipment




(Limited Brands & Li Fung)
Source: UNCTAD (2002) 
 
Table 1c The Top Telecom Equipment Manufactures (2000)  
(Unit: Billions of dollars) 
rank company Home country  sales
1 Ericsson Sweden 31.3
2 Nortel Networks Canada 30.3
3N o k i a F i n l a n d 2 7 . 2
4 Lucent technology U.S. 25.8
5C i s c o   S y s t e m s U . S . 2 3 . 9
6S i e m e n s G e r m a n y 2 2 . 8
7 Motorola U.S. 22.8  
Source: UNCTAD (2002) 
  4Table 1d The Five Largest Contract Electronics Manufactures (2002) 
                              (Unit: Billions of dollars) 
rank company Headquarters Revenue
1S o l e c t r o n U . S . 1 6 . 5
2 Flectronics international Singapore 13.2
3 SCI Systems,Sanmina U.S. 12.1
4 Celestica Canada 11.3
5 Jabil Circuit U.S. 4.9  
Source: UNCTAD (2002) 
 
 
Statistics also provide ample evidence of the globalization of Japanese firms. The sales of the foreign 
affiliates of Japanese firms amounted to 60 trillion yen in 1993, while export sales amounted to 50 trillion 
yen. Japanese firms also increasingly rely on outsourcing, which in the Basic Survey of Business Activity 
(Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa), for example, is defined as the reliance on the other firms for the 
production or assembly of final goods, parts, or materials. Table 2a indicates that outsourcing payments to 
the foreign firms were 2.8 trillion yen, and receipts from licensing (patents only) to foreign firms 
amounted to about 0.16 trillion yen, where it should be noted that half of this amount went to  “foreign 
firms” that were the affiliates of Japanese firms. 
2 Table 2a shows, the values of outsourcing and licensing 
are lower than those of FDI and exports, but they tend to increase in technology-intensive industries. As 
shown in Table 2b, in 1998, the number of exporting firms was high in the general machinery and the 
electrical machinery sectors, while the number of firms serving overseas markets through foreign 
                                                      
2 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (2002) shows that Japanese firms’ 
income from licensing in foreign markets, which includes patents, brand names, design and business 
know-how, amounted to 1 trillion yen in 2000.  
  5affiliates was high in the general machinery and transport machinery sectors. Moreover, the number of 
firms which outsourced to independent foreign firms was high in the electrical and general machinery 
sectors. Finally, the number of firms that license to foreign firms was high in the chemical industry. 
Irrespective of the mode of international activity, firms serving foreign markets tend to hail from 
technology-intensive industries. 
 




Food 2568 0.434 1454 31316
Beverages 34 0.434 19 320
Spinning 57 0.182 47 4231
Textiles 0 0.182 0 24743
Lumber and wood products 0 0.753 0 4052
Furniture 9 0.753 2 4591
Pulp, paper and paper prods. 271 0.406 161 15777
Publishing and printing 63 0.846 10 4648
Chemicals 88735 0.455 48381 11987
Petroleum products 86 0.454 47 36
Plastics 448 0.610 175 13941
Rubber products 2832 0.737 745 36350
Leather and leather products 0 0.753 0 739
Stone, clay and glass products 167 0.853 25 20915
Steel 2721 0.135 2355 4148
Nonferrous metals 4185 0.447 2312 11291
Metal products 619 0.369 391 8084
General machinery 11201 0.482 5806 311204
Electrical machinery 28957 0.534 13493 1900033
Transportation machinery  17259 0.640 6211 364144
Precision machinery 430 0.393 261 43679



















  6Table 2b Number of Firms Serving Foreign Markets through Exports, Overseas Production, 
Outsourcing or Licensing by Industry (1998) 
No. of firms serving foreign markets through
Exports Overseas Outsourcing Licensing Total
production to foreign to foreign
firms firms
Food 87 72 23 10 1,455
B e v e r a g e s 3 9 1 742
Spinning 50 36 10 3 401
Textiles 31 33 28 0 455
Lumber and wood products 11 10 3 0 176
Furniture 18 14 14 1 192
Pulp, paper and paper prods. 40 26 3 5 450
Publishing and printing 57 32 13 2 841
Chemicals 438 154 30 64 941
Petroleum products 26 3 2 3 59
Plastics 130 75 28 8 685
Rubber products 56 30 18 3 150
Leather and leather products 8 3 3 0 45
Stone, clay and glass product
2 1 5
s 106 40 15 4 603
Steel 76 31 15 9 407
Nonferrous metals 105 58 23 6 339
Metal products 208 84 43 10 1,036
General machinery 712 199 172 28 1,645
Electrical machinery 702 314 239 34 2,061
Transportation machinery  321 202 81 30 1,196
Precision machinery 201 58 63 7 367
Total 3422 1491 830 229 13,719
 
 
The rapid internationalization of the global economy in recent decades has spawned a burgeoning 
literature on the causes and determinants of firms’ international activities. In the field of international 
economics, studies have attempted to explain the circumstances under which firms choose to engage in 
such activities and the form – foreign direct investment, exporting, outsourcing, or licensing – they take. 
For instance, as discussed in the previous chapter, industry characteristics are one potential determinant of 
  7international activities. In industries where transport costs are high, firms are more likely to choose foreign 
production than exports as a way of serving overseas markets. In contrast, economies of scale level tend to 
tip the balance in favor of exporting rather than local production.
3  
However, even within the same industry, variations among firms have been observed. Some firms 
sell only to the domestic market, while others serve foreign markets through exporting, foreign affiliates, 
outsourcing, and/or licensing. This chapter examines if productivity plays a key role in determining 
whether a firm internationalizes, and if so, which form this takes (i.e., FDI, exporting, outsourcing or 
licensing) in the case of Japanese manufacturing firms. 
The following methodology is employed for this purpose. First, TFP levels using firm level data are 
calculated. Then, the productivity of different types of firms is compared, using firms with foreign 
affiliates as the base-line against firms engaged in exporting, outsourcing or licensing.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section provides a survey of the 
related literature on the determinants of multinational enterprises’ mode of serving foreign markets. 
Section 3 explains the data set and how TFP levels are measured. Section 4 shows some empirical tests, 
while Section 5 presents a regression analysis of the issue. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Literature  Survey   
Exporting versus FDI 
This chapter investigates whether firms’ productivity is a determinant of their mode of serving 
                                                      
3 See, for example, Brainard (1993, 1997). 
  8foreign markets. The previous chapter considered whether industry characteristics such as scale 
economies and freight costs determined whether firms’ chose FDI or exporting. As discussed in Helpman, 
Melitz, and Yeaple (2002) and Head and Ries (2002), firms which expand their business through FDI 
may be more productive because they need to bear the fixed costs of establishing production facilities in 
foreign countries.  
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2002) examined the international activities of heterogeneous firms 
within the same industry, showing that even firms within the same industry do not serve foreign market 
through the same channels (such as exporting or foreign affiliates) or use these to the same extent. They 
found that the mode of international activity was a function their productivity.  
Head and Ries (2002) showed in their model that one would expect productivity to be lowest for 
those firms that do not serve overseas markets either through exports or foreign affiliates but only sell to 
the domestic market. Productivity levels should be higher for exporting firms and higher still for those that 
sell both through exporting and affiliates. The most productive firms, however, would be those serving 
foreign markets only through foreign affiliates. Figure 1 shows the critical levels for exporting and FDI. 
First, rising trade costs increase the critical productivity to make exporting profitable. Second, higher trade 
costs lower the critical productivity to make FDI preferable to exporting. Finally, a higher fixed cost of 
operating foreign affiliates increases the productivity necessary for FDI to be more profitable than 
exporting. Their empirical results, using Japanese firm level data, generally confirm their theoretical 
predictions, though based on their empirical tests, the most productive Japanese manufacturing firms are 
those that sell abroad through both exporting and foreign affiliates.  
  9Outsourcing versus FDI 
As globalization progresses, firms increasingly fragment their producing processes. Rather than 
carrying out all processes in the home country, some firms transfer intermediate processes to affiliates in 
low-wage country and then either ship their products back home or sell them in a third country. Other 
firms, in contrast, contract out production processes or the production of some parts to independent firms.  
Helpman and Grossman (2002) demonstrated that the mode a firm chooses – FDI or outsourcing – 
depends on the firm’s productivity. Focusing on the contracts a parent firm (the principal) enters with its 
employees and independent firms, their model shows a number of things.  










Source: Head and Ries (2002) 
 
 
First, the least productive firms in a particular industry would use outsourcing to less developed 
countries. Such outsourcing arrangements do offer the benefit of lower labor costs; however, a major 
shortcoming of outsourcing is that firms do not have any direct control over the quality of the final product. 
Second, the model shows that firms with intermediate productivity set up foreign affiliates; this allows 
them direct control over the production process and hence product quality, but incurs monitoring costs of 
local managers. Finally, the most productive firms outsource some parts of production process to 
independent firms in order to avoid the costs of monitoring managers. 
 








Source: Helpman and Grossman (2002) 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts this comparison for different levels of revenue productivity levels. Ro shows the 
revenue from outsourcing and Rv  shows the revenue from vertical integration, including in-house 
production and FDI. A firm prefers to buy components from an independent supplier when its own 
productivity is sufficiently high or rather low. However, a firm with an intermediate productivity level will 
choose vertical integration. The advantage of vertical integration for an intermediate range of productivity 
levels stems from the opportunity it affords the firm to monitor some of the managers’ effort. If all tasks of 
managers can be monitored and rents of principal is not reduced in the most productive firms, the firm can 
  12achieve revenues that are as high with integration as with outsourcing.  
 
Licensing versus FDI   
According to the transaction-cost model of multinational enterprises, one reason behind the 
existence of MNEs is the possession of intangible assets. A firm that possesses intangible assets and 
would like to capitalize on these beyond its home market can do so by using various alternative channels. 
One such channel is to establish a foreign affiliate, another to license production to an established firm in 
the foreign country. A firm may prefer to use licensing agreements rather than FDI for a number of 
possible reasons. These include, for example, a lack of sufficient skill or capital to set up an affiliate, or 
investment barriers in the target country. When the intangible asset is a particular technology, the nature of 
this technology is likely to play an important part in this decision. Thus, if the technology is not difficult to 
teach to a foreign firm, then licensing may be the preferred option, which has the advantage of a very short 
ramp-up time. However, if the technology involved is a core or leading-edge technology, then licensing 
carries the danger of a leakage of the technology to a competitor and the firm is likely to prefer 
establishing its own affiliate. 
 
3  Data Sources and TFP Measurement 
Description of Data Sources and Variables 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between firms’ productivity level and 
the type of international activity – exporting, FDI, outsourcing or licensing – they engage in. To this end, a 
  13firm-level panel data set is constructed based on the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of 
Business Activity) – a survey covering firms with more than fifty employees. 
 
TFP Measurement  
The discussion now turns to the measurement of TFP that will be used to analyze the international 
activities of heterogeneous firms. In this context, the work by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and 
by Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) serves as a useful point of departure to devise a way of measuring the 
relative productivity of firms. Caves et al. introduce the concept of a multilateral productivity index, 
which is calculated as follows: subtract average output of the industry, the factor of production of each 
firm, and the average factor of the industry from the output of each firm. The industry average factor 
which is multiplied by the average cost share of the industry is subtracted from each firm’s factor of 
production multiplied by each firm’s cost share. This index is very useful when the object is to compare 
the productivity of more than two firms at a particular point in time. However, it is inappropriate in a 
dynamic context, i.e., when allowing for the passage of time and the entry and exit of firms, which lead to 
changes in the number of observations, in average productivity within the industry, and in the productivity 
of individual firms. Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) overcome this problem by using a Divisia Index, 
which reflects changes in the distribution of productivity and changes in the productivity of the 
representative firm as time passes. Because this paper deals with a longitudinal panel data set, TFP 
measurement based on Good et al.’s approach is appropriate.  
Following this example, the TFP level of a firm here is calculated as the difference with the 
  14representative firm within the same industry. Thus, the TFP level (in logarithmic form) of firm f at time t is 
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where Yft is the output of firm f at time t,we use sales from data set, Xift is factor input i, Sift is the cost share 
of factor i in total costs. The overbar indicates industry averages. The TFP level of each firm is calculated 
using equation (1) which considers not only the relative TFP level compared with a representative firm at 
time t in the same industry but also changes in the productivity distribution as time passes. We use the 
3-digit industry classifications of the Kigyo Kastudo Kihon Chosa.  
The following variables are used to calculate TFP. Output obtained from the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon 
Chosa, while deflators by industry is obtained by dividing nominal output with real output using the IO 
Tables of the Management and Coordination Agency. Capital stock is estimated as follows. First, plant 
and equipment investment (excluding expenses for land and buildings) at the 3-digit-level, obtained from 
Census of Manufactures published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, is divided by the 
SNA deflator and accumulated by the perpetual inventory method. Next, we calculate the real market 
price/nominal book value ratio, which is the real capital stock divided by nominal tangible fixed assets 
(book value, end of year) obtained from the Census of Manufactures.  
  15We use tangible fixed assets from the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa as the real capital stock of each 
firm, which is multiplied by this preceding real market price/nominal book value ratio. To adjust for the 
utilization rate, we use the utilization ratio from Fukao and Murakami (2000). Cost shares are calculated 
using capital service price data by industry from the JIP database.  
 Costs for materials are calculated as total operating costs minus other expenses such as rent, wages, 
depreciation and taxes, while material costs at constant prices are obtained in the same way as in the 
calculation for output above. In order to calculate productivity precisely, we exclude raw material, energy 
and other costs from output. The amount of  raw materials and energy used reflects firms’ utilization ratio 
which is determined by the demand conditions firms face.  
 Constant labor input is calculated by multiplying the number of employees by the labor hour index of 
the SNA divided by 100. Both 0.1% tails of the distribution of output, capital stock, employee, payment, 
and material are deleted as outliers. 
 
4  Empirical Tests 
In order to examine the hypothesis that firms engaged in overseas production are more productive, 
the observations in the data set are classified into the following groups: (1) firms which do not sell abroad 
either through exports or FDI (but might possibly use either outsourcing or licensing) (2) firms which 
serve foreign markets through both exports and FDI; (3) firms which serve foreign markets only through 
FDI; and (4) firms which serve foreign markets only through exports. 
Firms are grouped into these four categories according to whether the data base indicates the 
  16presence of export sales (i.e. where these are not zero) and/or employees at foreign affiliates (i.e. where 
these are given and hence not zero). 
In this paper, the terms FDI and foreign affiliates refer to establishments for the purpose of overseas 
production only. Foreign affiliates that only serve as overseas sales offices are excluded. 
Similarly, to examine whether firms that outsource production are more productive than firms that 
have established their own production facilities overseas, firms are divided into the following four groups: 
(1) firms which are neither engaged in outsourcing nor FDI; (2) firms which serve foreign markets 
through both outsourcing and FDI; (3) firms which serve overseas markets only through FDI; and (4) 
firms which serve overseas markets only through outsourcing. Firms that are not engaged in outsourcing 
are those whose outsourcing value is zero, while firms not engaged in overseas production are those 
whose number of employees at foreign affiliates is zero. 
 To examine whether firms that rely on licensing are more productive, the same method is used. In 
order to examine the various hypotheses discussed above, a sub-sample of each group is created for each 
hypothesis and the average productivity is compared with the sub-samples.  
 
Exporting versus FDI  
At first, the productivity of exporting firms is compared with that of firms which serve foreign 








TFP level 68369 -0.0062 0.1982 -3.7173 2.2991
log(FDI/Export)
1 68369 -2.9237 2.2622 -15.8342 7.2894
log(FDI/Outsourcing)
1 68369 -3.4908 1.9695 -16.6319 6.3533
log(FDI/Licensing)
1 68369 -3.3225 1.8140 -11.7817 6.2146
log(FDI/Export)
2 62930 -2.9736 2.2869 -15.9103 7.1687
log(FDI/Outsourcing)
2 67241 -3.4972 1.9685 -16.6640 6.3063
log(FDI/Licensing)
2 67571 -3.3268 1.7990 -11.8096 6.2114  
Notes:  
1) The variable includes firms serving overseas markets through both foreign affiliates and other channels such as 
export, outsourcing or licensing.  
(2) The variable excludes firms serving overseas markets through both foreign affiliates and other channels such as 
export, outsourcing or licensing.  
1) and 2) are measured as deviations from the industry averages.  
 
Table 4a   Exports versus FDI: Tests Based on Pooled Panel Data from 1994 to 1998 
[Comparison of TFP Level ] observation mean
standard
deviation
Firms which do not serve foreign markets 49774 -0.021 0.202
Firms which serve foreign markets through exports 11874 0.032 *** 0.187
Firms which do not serve foreign markets 49774 -0.021 0.202
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  1506 0.004 *** 0.189
Firms which serve foreign markets through exports 11874 0.032 *** 0.187
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  1506 0.004 0.189
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  1506 0.004 0.189
Firms which serve foreign markets through both exports and foreign affiliates  5445 0.043 *** 0.164
Firms which serve foreign markets through exports 11874 0.032 0.187
Firms which serve foreign markets through both exports and foreign affiliates  5445 0.043 *** 0.164  
Note: Exporting firms here are defined as firms whose exporting sales are greater than zero and the number of 
employees of foreign affiliates is zero. Firms serving foreign markets through foreign affiliates are defined here as 
firms whose number of employees of foreign affiliates is greater than zero and export sales are zero. Firms, serving 
foreign markets through both export and FDI, are defined as those whose export sale and number of employees are 
greater than zero. 
 
  18Table 3 shows summary statistics of the variables that are used in the empirical tests in this chapter. 
In the underlying statistics, exports are defined as merchandise that pass customs under the name of the 
exporting firm, including sales to overseas affiliates and related companies. Since the export sales data in 
the underlying statistics include export sales to foreign affiliates, we adjusted the value of export sales by 
using the ratio of export sales to foreign affiliates over total exporting sales. The ratio was obtained from 
the Basic Survey of Overseas Activities (Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa). Table 4a summarises the 
findings of the test. The table shows that firms that do not serve foreign markets through exports or FDI 
display a lower productivity than firms that do serve foreign markets either through exports or FDI. 
Comparing firms that only export with those that only engage in overseas production, the productivity of 
the former is higher. Moreover, comparing firms that only engage in FDI with those that both export and 
engage in FDI, the productivity of the latter is higher. Similarly, firms that both export and engage in FDI 
enjoy a higher productivity than firms that only export. 
These findings contradict the predictions of the theory developed by Head and Ries (2002). Head 
and Ries (2002) predicted that firms selling only to the domestic markets would be the least productive, 
followed by those engaged in exports and then those relying on both exports and FDI, while firms which 
serve foreign markets only through FDI would be the most productive. But the ranking implied by the 
results here – from least to most productive – is as follows: (1) firms which only sell to the domestic 
market; (2) firms which rely only on FDI; (3) firms which only export; and (4) firm which rely on both 
exports and FDI.  
The finding that the productivity of firms which serve foreign markets through FDI is lower than that 
  19of exporting firms differs from in the findings of Head and Ries’s (2002) for Japanese firms and Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple’s (2003) results for American firms. A possible explanations for this difference is that 
the data used here cover all Japanese firms with more than 50 workers, while Head and Ries (2002) used 
data covering only large, listed companies. When we divided the firms in our database into two groups – 
smaller firms with less than 300 workers and larger firms – and then conduct our average test, we obtain 
the same conclusion that exporting firms are more productive. This result is shown in Table 4b. However, 
this table suggests that the firms with a greater number of workers are more productive. Given that Head 
and Ries (2002) use data of about a thousand firms of the listed companies, their results indicating that 
firms serving overseas markets through foreign affiliates are more productive, might simply be a 
reflection of firm size. 
 
Table 3-4b　Exports versus FDI:  TFP of Smaller Firms and Larger Firms observations mean
standard
deviation
Smaller firms which serve foreign markets through exports 11874 0.023 *** 0.192
Smaller firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  1506 -0.018 0.191
Larger firms which serve foreign markets through exports 4002 0.050 *** 0.176
Larger firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  732 0.027 0.184  
 
Outsourcing versus FDI 
Next, we compare the productivity of the firms which transfer production facilities abroad and that of 
firms which outsource to foreign countries. The results are summarized in Table 4c. 
  20Table 4c  Outsourcing versus Foreign Affiliates: Tests Based of Pooled Panel Data from 1994 to 
1998 
[Comparison of TFP Level ] observation mean
standard
deviation
Firms which do not serve foreign markets 59943 -0.012 0.201
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates 5593 0.028 *** 0.174
Firms which do not serve foreign markets 59943 -0.012 0.201
Firms which serve foreign markets through outsourcing  1705 0.045 *** 0.173
Firms which serve foreign markets through outsourcing  1705 0.045 *** 0.173
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates 5593 0.028 0.174
Firms which serve foreign markets through both outsourcing and foreign affiliates 1358 0.060 *** 0.155
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates 5593 0.028 0.174
Firms which serve foreign markets through both outsourcing and foreign affiliates 1358 0.060 *** 0.155
Firms which serve foreign markets through outsourcing  1705 0.045 0.173  
Note: Outsourcing firms here are defined as firms whose payments for outsourcing are greater than zero and the 
number employees of foreign affiliates is zero. Firms serving foreign markets through foreign affiliates are defined as 
firms whose number of employees of foreign affiliates is greater than zero and payments for outsourcing are zero. 
Firms serving foreign markets though both outsourcing and FDI are defined as firms whose payments for 
outsourcing and number of employees of foreign affiliates are greater than zero. 
 
Looking at firms that neither outsource nor engage in FDI, we find that their productivity is lower 
than that of firms that engage in one of the two international activities. Comparing firms that engage in 
one of the two activities shows that those that outsource are more productive than those that rely on 
foreign affiliates. Finally, firms that serve foreign markets through both outsourcing and FDI display a 
higher productivity than firms that rely on only one of these two international activities.  
Again, we compare these results with the theoretical predictions. Helpman and Grossman (2002) 
predict the following ranking in terms of firms’ productivity (in ascending order of productivity): (1) 
outsourcing firms; (2) firms using foreign affiliates; (3) domestic firms; (4) outsourcing firms. However, 
the productivity ranking result obtained in this paper is: (1) domestic firms; (2) firms engaged in FDI; (3) 
  21outsourcing firms; (4) firms serving foreign markets through both channels. One reason, why in the case 
of Japanese manufacturing industries, outsourcing firms are more productive might be that the number of 
outsourcing firms is high in technology-intensive industries, such as the general and electrical machinery 
industries. 
 
Licensing versus FDI   
Next, we compare the productivity of licensing firms and that of firms serving foreign markets 
through FDI. The results are summarized in Table 4d. As licensing payments in the statistics include those 
from foreign affiliates, we adjusted such payments by using the ratio of licensing payments from foreign 
affiliates over the licensing payments by industry. This ratio is obtained from the Statistics Bureau, 










  22Table 4d Licensing versus Foreign Affiliates: Tests Based of Pooled Panel Data from 1994 to 
1998.
[Comparison of TFP level] observation mean
standard
deviation
Firms which do not serve foreign markets 61147 -0.011 0.201
Firms which serve foreign markets through licensing  501 0.052 *** 0.166
Firms which do not serve foreign markets 61147 -0.011 0.201
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  6153 0.031 *** 0.174
Firms which serve foreign markets through licensing  501 0.052 *** 0.166
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  6153 0.031 0.174
Firms which serve foreign markets through both licensing and foreign affiliates 798 0.062 *** 0.136
Firms which serve foreign markets through foreign affiliates  6153 0.031 0.174
Firms which serve foreign markets through both licensing and foreign affiliates 798 0.062 0.136
Firms which serve foreign markets through licensing  501 0.052 0.166  
Note: Licensing firms here are defined as firms whose revenue from licensing is greater than zero and number 
employees of foreign affiliates is zero. Firms serving foreign markets through foreign affiliates are defined as firms 
whose number of employees of foreign affiliates is greater than zero and revenue from licensing is zero. Firms 
serving foreign markets though both licensing and FDI are defined as firms whose revenue from licensing and 
number of employees of foreign affiliates are greater than zero. 
 
 
In line with the findings in the previous subsections, it is found that firms that neither license nor 
engage in FDI display a lower productivity than those firms that engage in one of these international 
activities. Comparing firms that engage either in licensing or in FDI, the productivity of the former is 
higher. And again, firms that engage in both activities display greater productivity than firms that engage 
in only one of the two. 
Contrary to what the literature would lead one to expect, the productivity ranking found here is as 
follows (in ascending order of productivity): (1) firms serving only the domestic market; (2) firms serving 
overseas markets only through FDI; (3) firms serving overseas markets only through licensing; and (4) 
  23firms serving overseas markets through both channels. 
The reason for this finding is the prevalence of cross-licensing. The National Institute of Science 
Technology Policy (2003) provides details on the technology exports of Japanese manufacturing firms. 
According to this survey, one-third of firms exporting new technology hail from the electrical machinery 
industry, which is very technology-intensive, and 25% of their licensing contracts take the form of 
cross-licensing. Nagaoka and Kwon (2003) suggest that listed companies in Japan predominantly 
cross-license with firms from developed rather than developing countries, i.e. firms that can offer assets of 
a similar technologically advanced stage. This situation may explain our result that firms relying on 
licensing are more productive, which contradicts the theory of internalization advantages.  
 
5   Regression Analysis 
These average tests do not consider potential inter-industry differences. Therefore, we next conduct a 
regression analysis including industry dummy variables to examine the hypothesis that the productivity of 
firms determines their channel of internationalization. The result is shown in Table 5. The first regression 
analysis shown in Table 5a includes firms which serve overseas markets simultaneously through both 
foreign affiliates and other channels. The second regression, shown in Table 5b includes firms that rely 
either on foreign affiliates or on other channels.  
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of employees in foreign affiliates to firms’ exports 
or outsourcing sales or licensing revenue calculated as the difference from the average ratio in the 
respective industry. As the Basic Survey of Business Activity does not provide data on the sales of foreign 
  24affiliates in every year, we made use of the number of employees in foreign affiliates. Details of the 
estimation procedure are provided in the appendix. Strictly speaking, the number of workers in foreign 
affiliates and the amount of sales through other channels as measures of the degree of firms’ 
internationalization are of course not directly comparable. Therefore, in order to minimize this problem, 
we measure firms’ degree of internationalization based on these statistics as the deviation from the 
average.  
The regression analysis supports the average tests above comparing firms that export or engage in 
FDI. The results show that more productive firms choose exporting rather than overseas production 
through FDI. The regression analysis including the firm dummy also showed the exporting firms are 
more productive. 
The regression analysis showed that more productive firms choose FDI rather than outsourcing or 
licensing. These results suggest that in the case of Japanese manufacturing industry, the theory by 








  25Table 5a Exporting, Foreign Affiliates, Outsourcing, and Licensing Regressed on Productivity 
TFP level -1.0093 *** -0.2209 *** 0.4866 *** 0.0140 0.9221 *** 0.0538
(-19.51) (-3.52) (10.89) (0.25) (22.12) (1.29)
_cons -3.9679 *** -3.4005 *** -4.3837 *** -4.5651 *** -3.8837 *** -4.3468 ***
(-109.74) (-43.84) (-140.16) (-66.52) (-133.33) (-83.85)
year-dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
indy-dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm-dummy no yes no yes no yes
obs 68369 68369 68599 68599 68369 68369
adj-R2 0.107 0.0268 0.1177 0.0002 0.0985 0.0824
FDI/Export FDI/Outsource FDI/License
Note: FDI/Export is calculated as the difference of ln((1+employees at the foreign affiliates)/(1+exporting 
sales*(1-the ratio of exports to foreign affiliates))) of each firm from the industry average. The other dependent 
variables are calculated as the same method. Firms serving overseas markets both through FDI and exports (or  
other channels) are included in this regression analysis.  
 
Table 5b Exporting, Foreign Affiliates, Outsourcing, and Licensing Regressed on Productivity 
TFP level -1.0037 *** -0.1671 *** 0.5400 *** 0.0711 0.8456 *** 0.0536
(-18.76) (-2.96) (12.02) (1.43) (20.48) (1.34)
_cons -4.1589 *** -3.4823 *** -4.4141 *** -4.5613 *** -3.9066 *** -4.3554 ***
(-106.26) (-47.26) (-138.28) (-73.62) (-135.05) (-87.46)
year-dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
indy-dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm-dummy no yes no yes no yes
obs 62930 62930 67241 67241 67571 67571
adj-R2 0.119 0.0351 0.1197 0.1078 0.1064 0.0921
FDI/Export FDI/Outsource FDI/License
 
Note: FDI/Exports is calculated as the difference of ln((1+employees at foreign affiliates)/(1+exporting sales*(1-the 
ratio of export to foreign affiliates))) of each firm from the industry average. The other dependent variables are 
calculated by the same method. Firms serving overseas markets through both FDI and exports ((or other channels)  
are excluded in this regression analysis. 
 
  266. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate whether firm’s productivity helps to explain their 
international activities and to examine empirically the theories developed by Head and Ries (2002), 
Helpman and Grossman (2002), and others, dealing with firms’ decision to serve foreign markets through 
various modes. According to the these theories, more productive firms tend to choose FDI rather than 
exporting, outsourcing or licensing as their preferred channel because FDI is accompanied with the fixed 
costs, partly of which are sunk costs, outsourcing is accompanied with risks in the contracts with the 
supplier, and licensing has possibilities to leak out the technological knowledge.  
The results of the investigation can be summarized as follows. The comparison of productivity levels 
of firms engaged in various international activities shows the following pattern: when exports and FDI are 
used as the relevant criteria, then we find that firms which engage in both activities display the highest 
productivity. Among firms that engage in only one of the two, those that export show a higher 
productivity than those that engage in FDI. Productivity is lowest for those firms that engage in neither of 
these international activities.  
The patterns in the other comparisons where similar to the result on exporting versus FDI. Thus, 
when examining outsourcing and FDI, those firms that engage in both enjoy the highest productivity, 
while those that outsource are more productive than those engage in FDI. Again, those engaged in neither 
of these activities are the least productive. Similarly, taking licensing and FDI as the criteria, again firms 
that engage in both are the most productive, while those that engage in neither are the least productive. 
Among those that engage either in licensing or FDI, the former are more productive.  
  27Finally, the regression analysis to consider inter-industry differences, showed that the firms that 
choose exporting more productive than those that rely on FDI as same as the result of the average test. 
However, the regression analysis showed the firms which choose FDI are more productive than the firms 
which choose outsourcing or licensing was not similar with the average test.  
Taken together, exporting firms showed their superiority through all tests against our expectation. 
The empirical tests using Japanese manufacturers showed the exporting firms are more productive. On 
the other hands, the empirical tests did not show the consistent results that the firms, which choose FDI, 
are more productive than the outsourcing or licensing firms.  
The empirical analysis using manufacturing firms in this chapter did not show the results which 
conform with the theory. However, we found that more productive firms in Japan choose various modes 
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Appendix 
This appendix shows how the number of employees at Japanese foreign affiliates in Asia and other 
regions was calculated.  
The data are based on the micro-data of the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of Business 
Activity), which provides detailed information on the status of Japanese foreign affiliates, such as the 
number of employees at foreign affiliates, the name of the host country, and industry classifications. We 
exclude firms which do not belong to the manufacturing sector and foreign affiliates set up solely for 
sales. 
The number of employees at foreign affiliates is available only up to the survey for 1994. For 
1995-1998, only the number of foreign affiliates are available, making it necessary to estimate the number 
of employees at foreign affiliates for this period. We do so by estimating the number of employees at 
foreign affiliates each year by referring to the Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of 
Overseas Activities) of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which records the number of 
employees at foreign affiliates by region and by industry each year. We assume that there are no 
differences between the Basic Survey of Business Activity and the Basic Survey of Overseas Activities in 
the distribution of Japanese firms and their foreign affiliates 
By using the Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Kai-ji), the average number of employees of each 
foreign affiliate by region each year is calculated. For example, the number of employees at foreign 
affiliates each year is calculated as follows:  
  32The Number of Employees at Foreign Affiliates of each year  
= the Number of Employees at Foreign Affiliates in 1994  
* the Number of foreign affiliates each year / the Number of Foreign Affiliates in 1994  
        * Average Number of Employees at Foreign Affiliates each year (Kai-ji)  
         / Average Number of Employees at Foreign Affiliates in 1994 (Kai-ji)  
 
  33